Definition
MLPS (Multi-Level Protection Scheme) (Network Security Level Protection) is the basic network security system in China. It implements hierarchical protection of information systems in accordance with the "Cybersecurity Law," "Data Security Law," "Regulations on the Security Protection of Critical Information Infrastructure," and standards such as GB/T 22239. MLPS (Multi-Level Protection Scheme) is divided into five levels (from Level 1 to Level 5), and the level is determined based on the system's importance, the consequences of security breaches, and business continuity requirements. It requires the implementation of security technical measures (identity authentication, access control, data encryption, auditing, etc.) and management measures, with evaluation and filing according to the level.
Key industry information systems in healthcare, finance, government, energy, and transportation must meet MLPS (Multi-Level Protection Scheme) Level 2 or above requirements. IoT SIM cards provide MLPS (Multi-Level Protection Scheme) systems with VPDN private networks, dedicated APN, data encryption, real-name verification, and other measures to ensure transmission security and compliance, meeting MLPS (Multi-Level Protection Scheme) requirements for communication security.
Technical Features
MLPS (Multi-Level Protection Scheme) 2.0 Extended to new industries such as cloud computing, the Internet of Things (IoT), and industrial control. In IoT scenarios, terminal access, data transmission, and platform security must all comply with MLPS (Multi-Level Protection Scheme) requirements. VPDN private networks can achieve logical isolation between terminals and platforms, and dedicated APNs can restrict access scope. Together with TLS/DTLS encryption, they ensure transmission security.
Use Cases
MLPS (Multi-Level Protection Scheme) is suitable for smart healthcare HIS, PACS, EMR, smart grid SCADA, smart drug supervision, government systems, smart transportation, and others. Typical scenarios include: private network transmission of medical data, secure feedback of grid data, drug supervision tracing, secure access to government data, etc. SimtoLink provides VPDN private networks, dedicated APNs, real-name verification, and compliance solutions for MLPS (Multi-Level Protection Scheme) scenarios.
What the SIM side must show at an MLPS inspection
When MLPS discusses an IoT SIM, the card is not a label that already says “compliant.” It is a set of controls on the communications boundary that can be inspected. If the graded system includes a large number of cellular terminals, the assessment looks at how identity is distinguished, whether transport is limited to the expected network, whether access is audited, and whether change leaves a trace. A default public access plus port forwarding usually cannot explain the access scope. Restricted access or a private network can narrow the addresses a terminal can reach, and that narrowing still needs a configuration record and a periodic review. Real-name registration, device-to-SIM binding, and stop and restore correspond to asset and identity. They do not replace application accounts on the platform. The encrypted session ends at the platform. The SIM only gets the bearer into the expected network egress.
The conditions have to say, inside the grading scope, which terminals, which platforms, and which stretch of cellular belong to this system. Test SIMs and SIMs on equipment already removed, if they can still attach, become unmanaged entries at an inspection. Logs should at least be searchable by SIM identity or device id for attach, authentication failure, and policy change. Retention should match the procedure, and the logs should not hold personal fields that are not needed. Key and certificate replacement needs a work order, and a failure must be able to return to the old configuration. Different security domains should not share one access point with nothing to tell them apart. If a supplier’s remote maintenance must enter over cellular, it needs its own account, a time limit, and an audit, not a remote desktop left open indefinitely. The network topology in the written procedure must match the live access-point name, so the drawing does not say private network while the live SIMs are still on the public network.
A common error is to treat the operator’s activation receipt as the system’s own control. The receipt shows the SIM was opened. It does not show that access control, audit, and the change process are in place. Another is to switch to restricted access just before the assessment and switch back afterward, with no record. Putting every terminal under one shared account cannot answer which device connected, and when. A SIM on retired equipment that can still attach is an extra entry. If cross-border or subcontracted logging stays in an environment that was not written into the scope, that also conflicts with the data procedure. The material should be able to follow one terminal to the SIM identity, the access point, the platform account, and the latest change order. One way to implement private access is described under VPDN. How a hospital system falls inside the grading scope is described under HIS.
Prepare inspection material from one real terminal: asset id, SIM identity, access point, addresses it is allowed to reach, the latest authentication failure, and the latest policy-change order. If any item is missing, that terminal is not yet inside the day-to-day control of the graded system. Keep a separate list of test SIMs, construction SIMs, and SIMs on removed equipment. If a SIM that is not on the list can still reach the platform, there is still a bypass. Log retention matches the period written in the procedure, and logs can be searched by SIM identity. A verbal “the operator has records” is not enough. A remote-maintenance account expires on its own. A long-lived shared remote-desktop password should not sit on a cellular terminal. The private-network name on the topology and the live access-point name stay the same. When the access point changes, change the drawing and the policy together. Where encryption terminates at the platform, say whether there is any clear hop beyond the SIM-to-platform stretch. After a scope change, a system merger, or a large terminal replacement, check again whether the old boundary description still holds.
When a new batch of terminals is added, write them into the asset list and the topology before opening access. Do not insert the SIM and register it later. An inspection that finds an unregistered terminal shows the control was not applied at activation. A certificate replacement before expiry needs a rollback, and on the day of replacement it must still be possible to search logs by SIM identity. A shared egress address does not replace each terminal’s own identity. Identity still has to land on a SIM identity or a device id.